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1How to run rail and water in the public interest
Recently, a lively debate has begun about alternative
models for the ownership of industries that are currently
in either the public or for-profit private sectors. A ‘public
interest company’ form has been suggested for the water
industry, rail network and local education authority,1 and
for the London Underground and health trusts.2 Social
enterprises have been suggested as a way of running
public services,3 tackling social exclusion and
modernising local government.4 The authors of a New
Economics Foundation report advise that: 
It is worth approaching the debate from the point 
of view of looking at the desired goals and outcomes 
in particular industries for customers and for the wider 
public interest, and then considering what mix of 
organisational forms would best achieve these.5
That is what this report does in relation to the water
industry and rail transport. It begins by looking at how
the ownership of natural monopolies has evolved over
time, with its move from private forms to public and 
back to private again, and with a continuing search for
ways of regulating private interests so that they serve
public purposes. Then it examines the record of the
privatised water and rail industries and finds that they
have failed to deliver what they promised. It finds that
regulation has also failed because it is inherently
unstable; either the interests of consumers and other 
key stakeholders are sacrificed or the profitability of the
company is undermined. 
The report then shows how opportunities have arisen 
for a new form of organisation to own water and rail
track assets that would put the customers and the wider
public interest back into the centre of the business. It
analyses in some depth the various elements that would
go into the design of a new utility mutual or non-profit,
finding that there are three key elements: membership,
ownership rights and representation. It defines the
difference between non-profits and mutuals in terms of
whether the organisation gives individuals ownership
rights to governance and the financial surplus. Working
through the theoretical permutations of the three
elements, it finds five types of organisation: a non-
member non-profit, a single stakeholder non-profit, multi-
stakeholder non-profit, single stakeholder mutual and
multi-stakeholder mutual. It then subjects these to
various tests: 
• Will the costs of member participation exceed 
the benefits?
• What are the consequences for risk and capital-raising 
from taking investor-owners out of the business?
• Would consumer members be motivated to 
participate over time? 
• Could the organisation be captured by an interest 
group or by its managers?
Four key questions are asked of what sort of organisation
should take over water and rail infrastructures: 
• Should there be a genuine membership?
• If so, which stakeholder group or groups should 
be members?
• Should they be given full ownership rights (a mutual 
rather than a non-profit) or just the right to take part 
in governance?
• If a multi-stakeholder option is chosen, how will the 
rights of each stakeholder be determined?
The recommendations in relation to water are:
• Water companies that want to sell their assets should 
be given a clear lead by OFWAT as to what sort of 
successor organisation is acceptable. This should be 
along the lines of a multi-stakeholder non-profit. 
• The new companies should be designed by a working 
group made up of representatives of the key 
stakeholders (including consumers) and endorsed 
by OFWAT.
• They should consider the merits of having a two-
tier structure of a management board and a 
stakeholder council.6
• The constitution of the new companies should include 
direct election of consumer representatives by 
customers. At first, the consumer board members 
should be appointed by the OFWAT National Customer 
Council, but as soon as is practical board members 
elected by the members in a postal ballot should 
replace them.
• The new National Consumer Council for water should 
be a more participatory form of organisation than its 
predecessor. It should have a regional structure, with 
each regional water company setting up a consumer 
council that is directly elected by residential and 
business customers in a postal ballot, and that has 
reserved places on the board. 
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The recommendations in relation to the governance of a
new model for Railtrack (or the proposed Network Rail) are:
• The assets of Railtrack should be transferred to a new 
company, set up as a multi-stakeholder non-profit.
• The new company should be designed by a working 
group made up of representatives of the key 
stakeholders, and endorsed by the Rail Regulator.
• Key stakeholders should include the train operating 
companies, the workforce trade unions, the 
government, and consumer representatives.
• Again, it should consider not having a unitary board 
but a two-tier structure of a management board and 
a stakeholder council.
• The constitution of the new company should include 
direct election of consumer representatives by 
customers. At first, the boards should be appointed 
from existing national and regional chairs of the Rail 
Passengers Council but, as soon as is practical, board 
members elected by the members in a postal ballot 
should replace them.
• The Rail Passengers Council and its regional 
committees should become democratically elected 
bodies, with a membership of regular travellers and 
local voluntary rail groups. It should be charged with 
developing a membership strategy to achieve this, and 
then to sustain members’ interest. It would then elect 
consumer members of the board of Network Rail.
In addition to these, there are recommendations about
how the National Air Traffic Control System and the Train
Operating Companies could be opened up to consumer
stakeholding through the issue of shares in a consumer
mutual. In particular, like football supporters, regular
travellers could buy shares in the companies and dedicate
the resulting governance rights to a passenger trust. This
would give them direct access to and, over time, some
control over, the way that train services are provided. 
The conclusion suggests that there is a need to:
• design governance structures and member relations’ 
strategies that work and are sustainable over time.
• design new forms of multi-stakeholder governance 
structures so as to bring more than one stakeholder 
into the business. 
• recognise that members may benefit just as much from
the more diffuse ownership structure of a non-profit as 
from a mutual.
How do we harness private interests for public purposes?
This is one of the big questions faced by British society
over the last 250 years – ever since the industrial
revolution began forcing people off the land and into 
the cities, out of their workshops and into the factories –
making us face up to the complexities and dangers of
modernity. First the question was resolved in favour of
private interests, then public, then in the 1980s back to
private again. It has not yet been satisfactorily resolved
and it is the purpose of this paper to suggest another way
of resolving it, that puts the consumers or users of
services at the centre of the business. 
There are strong arguments in favour of letting the
private sector get on with providing services, with as 
little interference from government as possible. When
Adam Smith wrote: ‘It is not from the benevolence of 
the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest’,7
he was setting up the most persuasive argument yet
invented for preferring market exchange to other ways of
meeting human needs. What Smith was saying was that
we live in a complex society where the division of labour
has been taken so far that we cannot hope to produce all
we need to live on independently of others. We need ‘the
co-operation and assistance of great multitudes’, but we
cannot rely only on altruism; we have to appeal to
people’s self-interest if we are to survive. The main way
to ensure that people meet each other’s needs is to let
them exchange goods and services in a free market. All
that state regulation does is to distort prices and, in the
long run, make everyone worse off. 
When, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Conservative
government sold off most of the public utilities – gas,
electricity, telecommunications, railways, water and so 
on – to the private sector, they justified their actions by
appealing to arguments that, at their core, derive directly
from Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’. It is important, then,
to prise open his argument to see if there is any room for
an alternative interpretation. There are two important
leverage points. First, Smith qualified his viewpoint when
he said: ‘It is by treaty, by barter and by purchase that we
obtain from one another the greater part of those mutual
good offices which we stand in need of.8 There are some
goods and services – the lesser part – that are not so
easily obtained in a market. For instance, Smith
recommended that: ‘Good roads, canals and navigable
rivers ... are the greatest of all improvements’ in breaking
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up monopolies and enabling markets to expand, and he
commended the Turnpike Trusts that at the time were
beginning to lay out a national road network.9 These were
private trusts, but they were virtually what we would call
‘non-profits’ (raising money by fixed interest bonds),
having their maximum toll prices regulated by Acts of
Parliament. After their job of improvement was done,
their time expired and the roads became free again. This
kind of public-private partnership lasted until the late
nineteenth century, by which time local government had
developed the capacity to deliver such goods itself. 
There are two types of public good. One type – such 
as public parks or clean air – is indivisible and non-
excludable, meaning it cannot be divided between users
and they cannot be prevented from using it. This means
it cannot easily be charged for. If the market cannot
charge for something it has to be provided free and so,
unless the state intervenes and provides through tax
revenue, it will be under-provided. The second type is a
natural monopoly, such as water, roads or rail transport.
It has the characteristic that it requires a large investment
in the means of delivering the good (water and sewage
pipes, rail track), but once it has been provided the owner
can then charge a monopoly price. The costs of entry to
that market are so high that nobody can afford to
compete. In such a situation, only government regulation
or a public buyout can protect the consumer. 
The second point to be made about Smith’s argument 
is that there is more than one way of organising ‘self-
interest’. It would be anachronistic to assume that his
argument applies without qualification to the dominant
modern form of trading – the joint stock company – when
at the time he was writing (1776) this had still to be
invented.10 In fact, around that time an entirely different
form of business was being developed, one that put the
consumer rather than the investor of capital at its centre. 
While being generally in favour of free markets, Smith
had also realised that, at every opportunity, dealers
would form cartels, fix prices and exact excess profits
that he called a ‘tax’ on the public. This is what happened
in the corn milling and baking industries and, in the
1760s, dockyard workers at Woolwich and Chatham
decided to buy their own corn mills and begin baking
bread for themselves. They started a consumer co-
operative movement that would, after some trials and
errors, become a major force in British retailing that, at
its peak, in the 1950s, would capture around 11 per cent
of the entire retail trade. Again, at around the same time
as Smith was writing, people began to set up friendly
societies that offered them some insurance against the
financial consequences of illness and death. By 1910
these societies were insuring the majority of the male
working class population. They became a kind of
embryonic ‘welfare state’ (not so fanciful a description,
since, when the state first began compulsory social
insurance, it was heavily reliant on the friendly societies
to deliver it). Also around the time that Smith was writing
his book, the first building societies were founded. By the
end of the nineteenth century these had become the main
means by which people saved and financed the buying of
a home. Together, these mutual sectors have the
common characteristic that they offer membership rights
and return dividends to the consumer rather than the
investor in the business. Their strategy has always been,
explicitly, to find a mechanism by which people on low to
moderate incomes can increase their power in the market
by working together. They do not rely on altruism, but
appeal directly to people’s self-interest, expressed in a
collective form. 
Right from the beginning of the industrial revolution
there has therefore been a third alternative to either for-
profit investor ownership or public ownership. Its growth,
in several directions and with more or less vigour, can be
plotted in every country that industrialised after Britain,
including most of Europe, Russia, Japan and the USA.11
It is an alternative way of doing business that may have
something to offer when we come to the question of who
should own and control natural monopolies such as
water and transport.
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Introduction
In the early stages of the industrial revolution, private
interests provided all natural, monopoly-type activities.
There were few public bodies and the ones that existed –
magistrates, local poor law commissioners, and boards 
of health – were fragmented and lacked credibility. The
companies needed some public sanction for their
activities, such as to obtain limited liability. In order to
have the power to compulsorily purchase land (crucial for
canals and railways), an Act of Parliament was necessary.
Water companies needed local government’s sanction to
operate in a particular area and there was ‘political
infighting of a squalid and expensive kind’13 about who
would get hold of the monopoly. In contrast to the earlier
burst of activity of the turnpike trusts, there was no
attempt by government to regulate prices (though
eventually the railways were subject to statutory limits on
ticket prices). There were fines for dangerous behaviour
such as drawing water from a polluted source, but
generally regulation was not so much light as non-
existent. On the canals and railways, one result was a
damaging lack of co-ordination; eight different gauges of
railway track, narrow and wide beam barge widths on the
canals, led to loss of profits all round. It was not long
before companies in both sectors ran into financial
trouble. The water companies failed to deliver to any but
the wealthier areas. In 1844 the Commissioners on the
State of Large Towns said ‘all stop short of … carrying
supplies … into the habitations of the poorer consumers’.
After the Sanitary Act of 1866, the authorities were
supposed to ensure that water was provided, but by 1885
another Commission, on the Housing of the Working
Classes, showed there had been little change. The
companies charged for water at a yearly rate. By the time
it reached the poor it was charged by the jugful. The
common people of the cities were reliant on standpipes,
wells and water butts until local authorities started
supplying water towards the end of the nineteenth century.14
What happened in Birmingham was typical. The
Birmingham Water Works Company had been founded 
in 1826 and was not badly run, but its coverage was 
still inadequate; the poor were still dependent on water
from wells.15 Joseph Chamberlain argued for
municipalisation, declaring: 
All regulated monopolies, sustained by the state, in the 
interests of the inhabitants generally, should be 
controlled by the representatives of the people, and not
left in the hands of private speculators.16
From private to public and back
again: the ownership of natural
monopolies 
The Skye Bridge affair
In 1995 a bridge was completed, linking the island
of Skye to the Scottish mainland. It was the first of
the public-private partnerships that are now being
used by the UK government to finance new
hospitals, schools, roads and prisons. Like the
Turnpike Trusts of old, it attempts to harness private
interests to public purposes. Accurate figures are
difficult to obtain, but one account says the bridge
cost £25m to build, plus government subsidies of
£16m, and that if the toll lasts for the maximum 27
years the investors will extract £88m from the
deal.12 Like the Turnpike Trusts, the bank that owns
it pays a toll-collector a fixed annual rate, though at
£770,000 a year this dwarfs the earnings a
nineteenth century toll booth would bring in (and,
unlike the turnpikes, the job is not put out annually
to auction). 
A soon as the bridge was opened it became 
a ‘natural monopoly’; the ferry service to the island
was discontinued. Local people have never got used
to the idea that the Bank of America should control
access to their island home (though, like the
turnpikes, the tolls are capped by government, and
the owner receives a subsidy to keep prices down
for regular users). They have campaigned for a free
crossing ever since. While their protests have been
more good-natured and non-violent than those
made against the turnpikes, the government’s
decision to treat those who refuse to pay the tolls
under criminal rather than civil law is reminiscent 
of that time (though the protestors of 200 years ago
faced the death penalty for destroying a toll gate).
However, the government has refused to buy out
the private interest because it would be too
expensive. The old Turnpike Trusts had to apply for
an annual extension to their licence after 21 years;
here, the tolls will be ended some time between 14
and 27 years, but it is unclear on what criteria the
Scottish Office will make the decision.
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He argued that all profit should go towards a reduction in
the price of water, and, most dramatically: ‘The power of
life and death should not be left in private hands’. In 1875
his Bill passed through Parliament. Within eight years, more
than 3000 wells, used by 60,000 people, were condemned
as dangerously contaminated. The death rate fell from
25.2 per thousand in 1871-5 to 20.7 in 1880-5. The public
takeover of the industry was unstoppable; by 1913 local
authorities provided 80 per cent of the water supply. 
In 1974, local government was reorganised and central
government took water out of their control; creating 10
regional water authorities in England and Wales and
three in Scotland, each covering a river basin area.
Though local accountability was lost, these regional
bodies made considerable efficiency gains; the English
and Welsh ones had, by 1989, reduced the number of
employees from 80,000 to 50,000. In 1990, the 10 regional
bodies in England and Wales were privatised (joining 
29 much smaller water-only companies that had always
been private). They were given ownership of the
infrastructure, and 25-year monopolies. Protected for 
five years from takeover, half are now owned by multi-
nationals, only one of which is a water company, the 
rest being energy companies keen to diversify into the
water industry.
The historical trajectory of the railways was similar, but
with public takeover being achieved much later – not until
1948. Calls for the nationalisation of the railways began
early on, but were unsuccessful until, after their virtual
takeover by the state and the exhaustion of the
infrastructure brought about by the Second World War, 
in 1948 the Labour Government created British Rail. By
then, such was the clamour for public ownership that an
interesting suggestion by the North Eastern Railway
Company that the government nationalise the
infrastructure while franchising out the lines to the four
big railway companies, met with little sympathy. Over the
next thirty years, British Rail gained a reputation for
needing ever-larger subsidies and for over-manning and
inflexible work practices (though the main cause of its
decline was competition from growing car ownership 
and the new motorways). It was an instant target for the
radical Conservative government of the 1980s, and by
1984 British Transport Hotels and the Sealink fleet had
been sold off. In 1996 the rail infrastructure was sold to
Railtrack, and passenger franchises began to be let to
train operating companies. 
From private to public and back again: the ownership of
natural monopolies 
A call for the nationalisation of the railways
F Keddell, writing in 1887:
‘The monopoly was granted under the middle-class
sophism that it would always be to the interests of
the railway companies to serve the community well,
in as much as their profits would increase if they
did their work well, and would decrease if they did
it badly. But being companies started with the main
object of making profit, they have steadily kept that
aim in view, and have constantly neglected the
interests of the community as much as they dared.
The greatest ingenuity is shown by railway
managers in their efforts to keep up high dividends,
especially in times of crisis and depression. This
national concern is run for profit and not for use,
and every nerve is strained to show the most profit,
even when the means adopted are such as to
prejudice future interests … to give a show of
prosperity they will starve the permanent way, 
and will keep down necessary expenses to a
dangerously low level … In practice the companies
have used their monopoly, as all monopolies have
been used, namely for their own benefit.’17
6How to run rail and water in the public interest
In the space of a hundred years in the case of water, fifty
years in the case of railways, natural monopolies have
gone from private to public and back to private again.
What has been lost and what gained through this re-
privatisation? It could be argued that the disadvantages
of private, for-profit monopolies – the costs of regulation,
the exploitation of consumers – can be justified if they 
can demonstrate that they are more efficient and effective
than any other way of delivering the service, or if they 
are able to raise capital more easily to upgrade the
infrastructure without being restricted by public sector
borrowing requirements. Certainly, these were the kinds
of arguments used by the Conservative government in
the run up to privatisation.18 However, the means to
greater efficiency was increased competition, and it 
was generally accepted that this could not apply in the
water and rail industries in the way that it could in
telecoms, electricity and gas. The difficulty of sharing 
the delivery system – water pipes, rail tracks – between
competing companies was beyond their means (though 
it is a problem that might be solved eventually in the
water industry). 
The record of the water companies on efficiency savings
is patchy. They were set a difficult task because the
previous public corporations had themselves made
significant efficiency gains. At first, they out-performed
OFWAT’s expectations, but then they were allowed to 
set up these expectations in the first place. It was in 
their interests to minimise the efficiency savings they
might make in order to secure a high price cap. Then, 
it was in their interest to make greater than expected
efficiency savings, with the resulting cash surplus used 
to boost profits. 
Leakage targets for water distribution were not set until
after the 1995 drought. Since then leakage has fallen from
31 per cent to 22 per cent of the supply, though, like all
efficiency measures, this relies on the companies’ own
figures. There was little improvement on sewer flooding
and water quality and little concern shown for improving
the quality of water in sites of special scientific interest.
Eight out of ten of the companies have been prosecuted
for a total of 22 pollution offences. There was little
attention paid to the capacity of the industry to supply
water, until the disastrous supply failure of the summer of
1995 when Yorkshire consumers had to queue up at road
tankers for their water. 
Efficiency is only one important criterion. Another is the
extent to which the companies guarantee to provide
water to the poor. In the first five years after privatisation,
the number of disconnections for non-payment tripled.
The alternative to disconnection that they developed –
pre-payment meters – amounted to a hidden
disconnection when people could not afford to pay for
the payment cards. In the 1998 Water Act, these practices
were made illegal. 
On the capital side, the initial expectations were that
large amounts of money would be raised to meet the
industry’s obligations to the European Union; an estimate
of £28 billion was made. One economist found that:
‘Capital expenditure started accelerating before
privatisation, rose to a peak in 1991-2, and then levelled
off and even fell, although the companies had projected
that it would continue to rise at the same rate.’19 This
meant that, by under performing against the regulator’s
expectations, this was another way they could make a
surplus to boost profits. Again, after the 1994 price
review, a number of companies revised their capital
expenditure plans downwards, but the resulting savings
were not used to cut prices. OFWAT was satisfied, but 
a Parliamentary Committee was severely critical of the
lack of improvement, particularly in the underground
network.20 On one estimate, sewers are expected by the
companies to last for an average of 280 years.21 It will
take over a hundred years to reline or replace water
mains, and several centuries to renew the sewers. On
another estimate, over the first six years the companies
should have spent 6-12 per cent of their infrastructure
asset values on renewals, but they actually spent only 
1.5 per cent.22 They displayed a short-termism that
boosted profits but was actually running down the asset
base. Even worse, because of their diversification into
other businesses that did not perform well, some of the
water companies began to get into debt and their parent
companies have had to provide them with loans (thus
finding another way to make money out of water). 
Railtrack is an even starker example of a privatised
company whose management has been worse than that
of its public predecessor, even though the shortcomings
of British Rail are generally acknowledged. There are at
least two distinct causes for Railtrack’s failure. The first
was the way in which the railway system was fragmented
at privatisation, leading to an adversarial and buck-
passing relationship between Railtrack and the train
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operating companies that did nothing to improve the
reliability of the system. The second was the way in
which Railtrack’s management performed. It was weak 
on engineering skills, and overemphasised the financial
aspect of the business at the expense of safety and
reliability. It replaced skilled direct labour teams with a
labyrinthine system of contracts and sub-contracts,
changing the incentive structures so that co-operation
was replaced by mutual suspicion and avoidance of
responsibility. When it was discovered that a broken rail
track at Hatfield had been known about for two years
before the crash, a criminal investigation began. The
consequences of the crash and its exposing of
management weaknesses were huge financial losses,
decline in the share price and, most crucial of all, a loss
of credibility in the financial markets. 
The railways had been privatised out of a belief that
private management is always better than public, and
that the private sector can be left to raise the funds
needed for improvements to the system. Both beliefs
had, within four years, been proved wrong. Railtrack’s
alternative was that, in order to retain the confidence 
of the market, the government should take a 15 per cent
stake in the company. However, this would still leave
private shareholders in control. There was an even more
fundamental problem. When a private industry needs
large amounts of state subsidy, yet needs to keep its
shareholders satisfied, some of that subsidy is bound 
to leak out into dividends. In Railtrack’s case, this was
illustrated when in May 2001 it used £138 million of a
£1.5 billion government grant to pay shareholders
dividends, despite having made a £500m loss. The only
way to avoid this ‘leaky bucket’ effect is to convert the
company to some kind of non-profit ownership structure. 
If private monopolies have failed, then who is to blame,
the industry or the regulators? Is the task of regulating
just too difficult? There is no avoiding the need for
regulation of a private monopoly. Since it gives market
power to one group – investors – who can then impose
significant market contracting costs on another – the
consumers – the only answer is price regulation by
government on behalf of customers.23 But the task is a
difficult one. Price-based regulation involves calculating
how much more efficient a company can become, and
then dividing the costs and profits between customers
and shareholders, weighing prices against quality.
Designed to provide reasonable prices to consumers
while preserving efficiency incentives for firms, it means
estimating what costs ought to be, by comparing one
company with another. The process imposes its own
costs, both on government in comparing the performance
of different utilities, and on the utilities in providing 
the information. 
Some commentators believe that with a privatised
monopoly the regulatory process is unworkable, as the
relationship between the provider and the regulator is
inherently antagonistic. As Holtham says of the water
industry: ‘The present system dooms the industry to an
adversarial relationship between companies and
regulator’.24 There is permanent information asymmetry,
because the regulator is dependent on the utility for
comparative information needed for the setting of prices,
targets for improvements, and so on. The provider has an
incentive to hide or distort the information the regulator
relies on. The rational response of companies is to
maintain some inefficiency, so as to mitigate the effects
of each price determination. On the other hand, a
determined regulator can impose price cuts, can fine
companies for poor performance, and set stringent
targets. But where the industry needs continuing
subsidies from government – in transport, but not in
water or air traffic control – the threat to withdraw
support can make the provider company unviable. 
The balance of power between provider and regulator
depends as much on the political conditions of the time
as on economic arguments. 
Another way of putting this dilemma is in terms of claims
on the added value generated by the industry. Economists
who analysed the first five years of operation of the
private companies, concluded that the regulator had
sufficient powers, but that in practice it was impossible to
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satisfy all the claims on the surplus without increasing
prices. Conflicts between the claimants mean it is
‘virtually impossible to regulate the water industry by 
any standards’.25
All of these points can be illustrated by the examples of
water and Railtrack over the last few years. Take the
water industry; in the mid 1990s it looked as if the water
companies were winning. As Kay described the situation:
‘The game which results is one which the regulator must
inevitably lose, because the regulator can never know as
well as the company what costs and capital programmes
are really required’.26 Then, when in 2000 the regulator
imposed a severe price regime, the pendulum swung the
other way and investors wanted to get out of ownership
of water infrastructure altogether. In public transport, the
initial regulatory regime was soft on Railtrack. However,
with the election of a New Labour government in 1997
the mood changed, a new regulator was appointed who
imposed record fines and made government funding
dependent on stringent new targets. 
In the rail industry, the task of regulation has been even
more difficult. First, there has only been one provider of
track and signal infrastructure, Railtrack, and so no
comparisons can be made with similar companies;
comparisons have had to rely on improvements relative
to the previous performance of British Rail. Second,
safety aspects of regulation were, until recently, the duty
of a division within Railtrack rather than an independent
regulator; in the light of several rail crashes this was
simply a mistake. Third, unlike the water companies that
deal directly with end-users, Railtrack’s customers have
been the train operating companies, and so there are two
layers of regulation, one of the infrastructure provider,
and another of the operators. Such a complex structure
has required complex regulation, with the Rail regulator,
the Strategic Rail Authority and the Health and Safety
Executive, all involved in various ways. 
The ‘bottom line’ in the case for regulation is that the
regulator prevents the exploitation of the consumer. 
What evidence is there from water and Railtrack that the
consumer has been protected? First, consider the water
industry. Over the first ten-year period since privatisation,
consumers experienced a doubling of water bills, while
the companies made £16 billion in profit, of which £9.5
billion was transferred as dividends to their parent
companies. The National Consumer Council estimates
that consumers overpaid by £6bn, around £300 each.27
Shaoul estimates that the share of the value-added going
to profits over the 11 year period was a staggering 51 per
cent.28 While customers might have thought they were
paying for improvements, in the first ten years nearly the
entire increase in their charges went towards operating
profit.29 Researchers from Greenwich University have
calculated that pre-tax profits doubled in the first year of
privatisation, and rose by 142 per cent in real terms in
eight years, and that the profit margins in England and
Wales are typically three or four times greater than in
four other European countries.30 In a seven-year period,
the highest paid directors’ pay increased by between 50
and 200 per cent. The privatised companies in England
and Wales charge roughly twice as much as the public
sector water companies in Scotland. It is not surprising
that they have become deeply unpopular with consumers. 
Kelda, the owner of Yorkshire Water, provides a graphic
example of the failure of regulation to protect the
consumer. The highest profits were made in the first few
years; by 1994, shareholders had made an annual return
of between 25 and 34 per cent in real terms, after paying
income tax. In the first ten years, profits more than
doubled, and the return on capital employed averaged 
10 per cent.31 Prices set by the regulator were more than
enough to cover the cost of investment and a return to
the investors; consumers had effectively funded both.
Dividends to the parent company totalled £954m, more
than double the £471m price paid for the shares at
flotation in 1989.32 As a result, there was a negative cash
flow in the subsidiary company that had to be offset by
increased debt. 
Consider also the record of Railtrack. After privatisation,
its flotation price of £3.80 soared to £15. For the next
three years it made record profits, paying generous
dividends, despite growing evidence of a lack of
investment and poor management of the track. We have
already noted how, having lost £534m after the Hatfield
crash, it paid its shareholders the same dividend as the
year before, effectively finding the money from the latest
government grant. 
There are ways in which the system can be reformed. 
For instance, there are too many regulators, and some
rationalisation would help.33 The technical capacity of
regulators to set standards, to monitor performance, to
use their powers of enforcement, could all be improved.34
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The amount of profit made can be restricted if the
regulator adopts a ‘rate of return’ system, such as 
is practiced in the USA (and was used in Britain with
private water-only companies before the regional water
system was privatised). Under this system, the regulator
calculates how much capital a company has invested,
how much the delivery of water is likely to cost, and then
fixes prices so as to deliver an acceptable rate of return
on the capital. In 1989, this was rejected for the
privatisation of water in England and Wales because 
it gives little incentive to contain costs, and a strong
incentive to invest too much capital. Instead, price-
capping was thought to provide greater incentives to
efficiency even though it did not give the regulator 
much financial control; if the companies made too much
profit, it was hoped this could be clawed back in the next
price round. 
The duty to protect the consumer can be made more
central to the work of the regulator, and the current UK
Government intends to do this in relation to water.
Accountability can be improved by turning current
consumer councils into independent, statutory bodies.36
At present, they are heavily dependent on the regulators.
For instance, all 10 chairs of the customer service
committees and the chair of the National Consumer
Council for water are appointed by the Director-General
of OFWAT, and are serviced by an OFWAT customer
services division services. The Rail Passengers Council
and the network of regional Rail Passengers Committees,
funded by the Strategic Rail Authority, seem more
independent and are certainly more outspoken. But
again, the national and regional chairs are appointed by
the Secretary of State for Transport (in Scotland, by the
Scottish Minister for Transport and the Environment), and
the rest of the Council are appointed by the Strategic Rail
Authority. It is doubtful whether these kinds of bodies
could ever make a significant impact. They remain at one
remove both from the ownership and control structure of
the industry and from consumers. 
The system cannot be reformed enough. It is inherently
unstable; either the regulator will be too soft or too hard,
and the companies will make extra profits or be in danger
of being driven out of business. The problem is well
stated by some advice given by the World Bank. It admits
that firms’ actual costs can be concealed by ‘clever
accountants’, and with imprecise cost estimates ‘there is
always a risk that the regulator will set the price too high,
hurting consumers and unnecessarily discouraging water
use, or too low, encouraging the wasteful use of water
and discouraging investment by water companies’.37 The
Bank’s solution is to auction water provision rights once
every 20 years, but this means that price regulation is still
needed in the years in between auctions. 
Is there another alternative, a third way between public
and private that might avoid these insoluble problems?
There are, in fact, at least three alternatives being
promoted, all of them situated somewhere between
public and private for-profit models, and with various
advantages and disadvantages. But before we submit
these to scrutiny, we need to know just how and why 
the opportunity has arisen for mutual forms of business
to be advocated for natural monopolies such as water
and transport.
10How to run rail and water in the public interest
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mutualisation? 
In the water industry in England and Wales the
opportunity for an alternative has been presented by the
industry itself. At privatisation, the Government gave the
industry a kick-start. It set aside over £5 billion of existing
debt, gave the new companies a ‘green dowry’ of £1.6
billion and offered the companies for sale at a substantial
discount.38 During the first ten years, the regulator,
OFWAT, allowed the companies to raise prices so as to
tackle a backlog in essential maintenance and an urgent
need to improve water quality and sewage treatment in
order to comply with European directives on standards.
Then, deep price cuts were demanded over the period
from 2000 to 2005. These provoked a crisis in the
industry, leading companies to want to divest themselves
of the water assets and to concentrate on providing the
service under contract. At Yorkshire Water, for instance,
the regulator demanded a 14 per cent cut in prices and 
a £1.5 billion spending programme over the five years.
Share prices fell by around 40 per cent. The board of the
parent company, Kelda, responded with a plan to create 
a Registered Community Asset Mutual that would buy the
assets of Yorkshire Water for their current regulated
value, and would initially contract with Kelda, and then
after five years tender competitively for the management
of its operations.39 Welsh Water, faced with a cut of 10.5
per cent in 2000, followed by 0.5 per cent and then small
rises over the next three years, proposed that its assets
be acquired by a new non-profit company, Glas Cymru.
This would realise £1.8 billion for current investors, to be
financed almost wholly by the sale of bonds. It was
promised that, because bonds are cheaper to service than
shares, the buyout would result in reductions in water
bills to consumers. Both companies needed permission
from the regulator to go ahead. In the end, Yorkshire
Water was turned down, but Welsh Water (Glas Cymru),
was given permission to transfer its assets to a non-profit
company and to this end has successfully raised £2bn on
the bond market. It is likely that, if the regulator allows it,
others will follow this example. 
In Scotland, the Scottish Parliament had to restructure 
the publicly owned water industry in order to make it
competitive. Mutualisation to a consumer co-operative
form was considered briefly, but rejected in favour of the
amalgamation of the three existing public corporations
into one, with representation of consumers taking the
form of statutory regional consumer councils. The
Scottish Co-operative Party campaigned to reopen the
debate, claiming that the Scottish Executive was unable
‘to understand the case for the mutual method of public
ownership’, but it seems that, for the moment, this form
will not be pursued.40
In the public transport sector the opportunity has been
provided by the failure of Railtrack. Sold for under £2
billion in 1996 (when its value was reckoned to be
£5billion) and with guaranteed annual revenue of £2.5bn
of which over 90 per cent was in fees paid by train
operating companies, it had a very easy start in life.
However, the backlog of maintenance and modernisation
that were needed to track and signals, and the huge cost
of upgrading the West Coast Main Line, meant it was
going to have to seek enormous sums from both the
state and the private sector; its own estimate was £27
billion. Over the next five years a series of disastrous
train crashes, and the disruption and financial penalties
which followed, led to the company becoming
unsustainable without massive and continuing injections
of government funding. In October 2001 it was put into
receivership. The Government has signalled its intention
to turn it into a non-profit company, Network Rail, and
has offered it a £3 billion subsidy to buy out existing
shareholders. Despite there being other commercial
bidders for Railtrack, it is likely that this plan will go
ahead. The company will be governed by a panel of
‘members’ picked from stakeholder groups such as the
train operating companies, trade unions, passenger
groups and representatives of the disabled. A former
chief of Ford UK will chair it, and the current Railtrack
chief executive will remain in post.41
The idea of a mutual alternative for the London Tube has
arisen for similar reasons, and has been strengthened by
the example of Railtrack. The Government’s plan was for
three (later reduced to two) contracts to be let to different
consortia of private companies to take control of the Tube
infrastructure, while the public sector would run the
trains. It faced strong opposition from the London Mayor,
Ken Livingstone and his appointed commissioner for
transport, Bob Kylie, whose alternative was for the
Treasury to allow London Underground to stay in the
public sector, raising capital through issuing bonds.
However, the idea of a non-profit solution for Railtrack
has led some commentators to suggest the same for the
Tube. From a governance point of view, both the public
corporation and the non-profit trust models could be
made accountable to key stakeholders, the main
difference being that the latter could more easily
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From privatisation to mutualisation? 
circumvent the Treasury Public Sector Borrowing
Requirement. This is a rule that makes public bodies have
to seek permission to borrow, and makes their borrowing
count as public expenditure. Non-profits, being private,
escape this rule and can borrow as and when they need
to. However, it is unlikely that the Government will allow
the London Tube to be turned into a non-profit or a
mutual. The plans for a public-private partnership are 
too far advanced and the view, emanating from the
Treasury, that this is the best alternative, seems to be
remaining firm. 
Non-profit company, consumer co-operative, multi-
stakeholder mutual, are all terms being used to describe
alternatives to for-profit, shareholder-owned private
companies. As if this were not complicated enough, the
Public Management Foundation has also been developing
a new model, the ‘Public Interest Company’ (PIC), for
ownership of water, the rail network and local education
authorities.43 Also, in the current policy debate, all of these
forms have been referred to rather loosely as ‘mutual’
solutions, and we shall have to be more precise. The
subject can be simplified if we keep separate two very
different discussions that are often held at the same time.
One concerns the relative merits of existing and proposed
legal forms, while the other identifies key features that
may be common to more than one form, and that need 
to be blended together carefully to ensure that any
alternative to private for-profit companies would work. 
There are at least four distinctions that are made in
choosing a legal form that turn out on closer inspection
not to be as important as one might expect. We mention
them now in order to dispense with them so we can get
down to more serious issues. First, should such an
organisation have charitable status? Organisations that
are registered as charities gain tax advantages, but they
are restricted in their ability to trade in different markets,
and sometimes they set up non-charitable trading arms
to overcome this. The important point is that a charity is
not a legal person, and so organisations have to be
something else as well – under UK law a company limited
by guarantee or a ‘bencom’ (industrial and provident
society for public benefit). So charitable status is
something to be added if it gives tax advantages and
does not restrict the organisation too much. Second,
should such an organisation have public purposes built
into it? The advocates of the public interest company
would like to see this enshrined in one legal form, but
bencoms and companies limited by guarantee can also
write public purposes into their constitutions. Third,
should such an organisation be able to make surpluses?
This is sometimes referred to as the difference between 
a ‘non-profit’ and a ‘not-for- profit’. In practice, all
organisations make some surpluses on their trading
accounts, unless they can foresee in advance exactly how
much a ‘cost price’ might be for their goods or services. 
It is what they do with the surpluses that matter, crucially,
whether or not they distribute them to individual
members. Last, there is the ability to demutualise. This 
is an important point. At present, all non-charitable, 
Air Traffic Control – towards a multi-
stakeholder mutual?
Air traffic control was, after a long period of 
political controversy, partially privatised, with 
a group of airlines taking a 46 per cent stake,
employees another 5 per cent and the state
retaining a ‘golden share’ of 49 per cent. Although
the resulting enterprise takes a conventional
investor-owned form, the airlines have made a
commitment to a non-profit strategy, with surpluses
being reinvested or used to reduce the airlines’ fees
rather than distributed in dividends. It could be seen
as a kind of multi-stakeholder mutual, in that the
interests of customers, workers, and the general
public are represented. There is, however, a
complication in that the immediate customers (the
airlines) have a different, if overlapping, interest
with end-user customers (air passengers).42 Recent
losses made by the airlines as a result of the
terrorist attack of September 11th have resulted in
government and banks each pledging an extra £30
million. If the company continues to be in financial
difficulty, then a restructuring of the shareholding
could change the balance of power, and consumers
could be more directly involved, perhaps through a
trust that owns shares on their behalf. 
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membership-based forms of organisation are subject to
the risk of being demutualised. The proposed legal form
of the PIC would bar it from being converted to another
form, and if it were wound up it would have to transfer its
assets to another PIC. However, amendments to Industrial
and Provident Society law currently going through
Parliament would make it much harder for members to
demutualise industrial and provident societies. 
Now we are ready to ask three really important
questions. First, does the organisation give membership
rights, and if so, to which stakeholders? In some
organisations there are no members, just trustees or self-
appointing boards. In others, membership is based on the
use that one stakeholder group makes of it (consumers,
workers or suppliers). In yet others, more than one
stakeholder group is able to take up membership. This
gives us three types:
1. non-member organisation (eg charitable trust).
2. single stakeholder member organisation (eg consumer 
mutual or an association).
3. multi-stakeholder member organisation (eg the Eroski 
co-op in Spain, that has consumer and worker 
members, or a company limited by guarantee that has 
specified members). 
Second, what do we mean by membership? It is possible
for any organisation to offer ‘membership’, simply as a
means of associating people with itself, or signalling that
some customers have earned bonuses or privileges. It
may be clearer if we restrict its use to include only those
situations where some kind of ownership or governance
right is being offered. Ownership generally means two
things: that members have the right to take part in
governance and to share in any surpluses the
organisation makes. If the organisation is a traditional
non-profit, it tends not to offer any such rights. Nobody
owns the business and trustees (in the case of trusts) or
boards of directors (in the case of companies limited by
guarantee) merely look after it on behalf of others. It is
barred by legal or constitutional restraints from
distributing surpluses. If it has members, it will usually
give them some rights over governance, such as the right
to vote on who is elected to a board of directors or
management committee. If the organisation is a mutual,
it will generally give both kinds of rights. This gives us
three types:44
1. no ownership rights (eg traditional charitable trust).
2. members have rights over governance (eg member-
based non-profit, or bencom).
3. members have rights over both governance and 
distribution of surpluses (eg consumer co-ops, 
financial mutuals).
Third, what kind of representation is there? It is useful 
to place the different types on a ladder of representation.
At the top is the direct representation of members by
elected individual members; each person has one vote,
and the candidate that gets the most votes takes a place
on the governing board or committee. Then comes
indirect representation through membership
organisations. This applies when a second-tier mutual 
is set up and its members are elected by other mutuals.
Then comes indirect representation by organisations that
are not themselves membership based, or whose boards
appoint representatives without asking their members to
vote. Finally, we have proxy representation, in which a
non-member organisation claims to represent a particular
class of people without giving them governance rights. 
In this class we include organisations that have a nominal
membership but do not offer membership rights to all
consumers. Here, the co-operative principle of open
membership is a useful test: does an organisation offer
membership to all people who are in the appropriate
relation to it (eg a class of consumer) or not? If not, then
we treat it as a non-member organisation. This gives 
four types:
1. direct representation of members by members 
(eg consumer mutuals).
2. indirect representation of members through member-
organisations (eg a secondary co-op).
3. indirect representation of interests by organisations 
(eg consumer council).
4. proxy representation (eg self-appointing board, 
consumer committee appointed by government).
At this stage, if we try to make sense of all this by simply
multiplying all the variables we will end up with far too
many types of organisation. Happily, there are only a few
combinations that work. The most important distinction is
between non-profits and mutuals. Suppose we label as
non-profits organisations that either have no members or
members who do not share in the distribution of
surpluses, and label as mutuals organisations that give
their members full ownership rights to both governance
What form should ‘mutualisation’ take?
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and surpluses. Then, we combine this with membership
to give five types:
1. non-member non-profit (eg charitable trust).
2. single stakeholder-member non-profit (eg National 
Trust, campaigning organisations).
3. single stakeholder-member mutual (eg consumer 
co-op, building society).
4. multi-stakeholder-member non-profit (eg community 
housing association).
5. multi-stakeholder-member mutual (eg the 
Mondragon co-operative system in Spain). Then, 
comparing these types with the ladder of 
representation shown in Figure 1, we find that the 
five types of organisation divide into four that are 
democratic (in theory at least), and one much less 
democratic. 
The strange case of Letchworth Garden City 
Ebenezer Howard was a visionary who, in his book
Garden Cities of Tomorrow, set out a plan for the
rehousing of the British people in garden cities that
would combine the best of both country and town
living, but leaving behind the overcrowding,
insanitary housing, lack of open space, pollution
and alienation of the industrial city. 
He was adamant that this could be provided
through private funding, and was against the state
taking any part. His supporters included some
‘plutocrats’, seriously rich aristocrats and
industrialists who were prepared to invest money at
a fixed rate of interest, leaving any surpluses made
by the company to be paid out to the community. In
this way, citizens would gradually buy out the
investors so that the city would be owned by a
community co-operative. This would then, using the
freehold income from land, begin to provide local
welfare services. 
Letchworth was gradually built, but the company
struggled financially and Howard’s ideas were only
partly realised. In 1947 the Labour Government
passed a new Town and Country Planning Act that
made all changes in land use subject to planning
permission. The ‘planning gain’ that resulted from
change of use would be taxed at 100 per cent.
However, when a Conservative government
abolished the tax, speculators began to take an
interest in Letchworth, and in 1961 a company
called Hotel York bought a controlling portion of the
original shares. With the prospect of their town
being privatised from under them, residents
supported a Private Member’s Bill that wrested back
control to a Town Corporation. Eventually, Howard’s
faith was partly vindicated; in 1973 the company
finally went into surplus, and now pays for local
NHS patients to be treated free at a private hospital,
as well as providing leisure and community
centres.45 In 1995, another Act gave Letchworth the
co-operative Howard had always wanted: a Heritage
Foundation registered as an Industrial and
Provident Society.
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Armed with these important distinctions, we can now
attempt to evaluate the different options that have been
proposed for the takeover of water and rail infrastructures.
The non-member non-profit form is the one that has been
chosen for the one water company that has successfully
transferred its assets. Glas Cymru has been designed
with an undemocratic governance structure. The
chairman will initially appoint four to six non-executive
directors and three executive directors. Membership will
be restricted to 50 people (rising to a maximum of 200),
also appointed by the chairman following nomination by
an independent panel. They will undergo a pre-selection
process to make sure that one group of interests does not
dominate, and will not be elected by or be responsible 
to consumers. Because we define membership strictly in
terms of the ‘open membership’ principle, in the ladder
Glas can be described as a non-member non-profit,
though its defenders might want to describe it as 
a multi-stakeholder non-profit with proxy representation. 
However, it would not be difficult to open up this
structure towards a multi-stakeholder non-profit. Glas is
already under pressure from the National Assembly for
Wales, which has commissioned work to develop a more
democratic constitution. As the housing association
movement has shown, the non-profit model is capable of
being adapted to more community-based and democratic
Figure 1: Ladder of representation by types of organisation
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forms of governance, if it takes advantage of the ability 
to issue membership shares. The wider the membership,
the more it begins to resemble a mutual. Ownership
remains nominal but membership confers some control
rights which give the opportunity to get involved in
governance. What such a model does not do is to give
members the right to a personal share in any surpluses
made. However, where the business is run in such a way
that it either sets prices so as to avoid making a surplus,
or uses the surplus to lower future prices (as Glas Cymru
is doing), this is not much of a disadvantage. Advocates
of the new PIC form expect it to be a multi-stakeholder
non-profit, with governance by representatives of the
public and staff and ‘with different types of election
appointment for different directors’.46 In relation to water,
they describe a ‘board representing a diverse range of
stakeholder interests’, who could either be appointed (as
in public quangos) or could come from elected bodies,
including customer representatives.47 In relation to the
proposed model for Railtrack – Network Rail – they
describe a board ‘made up of those with an interest in 
rail services: passengers, the train operating companies,
government, unions’.48 However, there is some
uncertainty about how far up the ladder of representation
they wish to go. For local education authorities that move
to a PIC model, they advocate either election from local
organisations or from the whole electorate. And they are
still working under the assumption that there will be a
unitary board. 
The New Economics Foundation, particularly through 
the work of Shann Turnbull, has been exploring the
inadequacies of a single board of directors. A unitary
board model creates a top-down control system that can
suffer from centralised power which may be corrupt and
can create inefficient and ineffective decision-making. 
The directors are both poachers and gamekeepers – in
other words – they are only accountable to themselves.
Non-executive directors, presumed to be able to hold
management to account, faces difficulties in accessing
independent sources of information from key
stakeholders. There is a need to explore alternative
governance models which at the very least incorporate
an additional stakeholder council which would involve
key strategic stakeholders providing independent sources
of information and scrutinising management behaviour.49 
The single stakeholder mutual has also been advocated
for the water industry.50 At first sight this is the simplest
and best option, because it replaces investor-owners with
consumers. Since all households are water consumers,
and they have an interest in low prices and good quality,
they ought to be put at the centre of the business.
However, just because an organisation is called a mutual,
it does not always mean that it is a genuine consumer co-
operative. The proposal by Kelda for the mutualisation 
of Yorkshire Water was for a board of five non-executive
directors and two executives. The customer-members
would directly elect only two of the non-executive
directors. The Director General of Water Services turned
down the idea on the grounds that it was skewed in
shareholders’ favour, the benefits to consumers were
hard to identify, and it did not demonstrate independence
from Kelda.51
Finally, the multi-stakeholder mutual is a logical
extension of the consumer co-operative idea, to 
include other stakeholders such as workers or the 
wider community. Currently, UK consumer co-ops are
considering moving towards a more inclusive model 
of governance, bringing workers onto the board. It is
becoming harder to argue for just consumers to be
involved; stakeholder theory is moving towards a 
more sophisticated understanding of who has a claim 
on the business, and how the ‘control architecture can 
be designed so as to encourage all stakeholders to 
take part’.52
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In a relatively simple form of organisation such as the
single stakeholder mutual, relationships with other
organisations are governed by contract, by partnership
agreement, or by a more formal agreement to set up a
federation. None of these kinds of relationships affect 
the governance structure, because they do not cross the
boundary between the organisation and its environment.
In a multi-stakeholder organisation, the governance
structure is dependent on a set of relationships with
stakeholders that often involve other organisations being
given membership rights. For instance, if workers have
places on a board they can elect these through a trade
union or works council. If consumers have board
members they can elect these directly through their own
consumer council or indirectly through other consumer-
based organisations or by proxy through having board
members appointed to represent them (as laid out on the
ladder of representation). 
If a multi-stakeholder form is advocated for water and 
Railtrack, then a new set of questions arises as to how
the stakeholders’ representatives are appointed. All the
usual arguments about representative democracy apply.
Consumer representatives should only be found from
among consumers, and then by majority vote, with
mechanisms for their being called to account for their
actions or inaction. Since all consumers have to pay for
the service, all should be eligible for membership in the
organisation that gives voting rights, and all should be
eligible to vote. This means that the task of organisational
design does not stop at the owner of the water or rail
assets, but continues into the question of how
stakeholders will be represented. 
In order for stakeholders to be able to take part in
governance, two innovations have to occur. First, there
has to be a genuine member-based organisation that
overcomes the ‘collective action’ costs faced by
individuals and organises their democratic representation
on the board of the service provider. This means creating
new, or reforming existing, consumer councils, staffing
them and funding them so they can operate effectively.
For other stakeholders, such as suppliers or the
workforce, it means having stakeholder panels, that feed
into a stakeholder council that is ‘capable of bringing
together the different stakeholders into one forum’.53
Second, once representatives are on the board, they have
to be supported by training and independent sources of
information, and have to gain the trust and loyalty of the
people they represent. The stakeholder council 
adopts roughly the role of shareholders scrutinising 
the separate board of management and providing
strategic information. 
Two-stage governance structures
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Having set out the options for ‘mutualisation’, we are
now able to begin to weigh up the advantages and
disadvantages of each. First, let us consider arguments
about the costs and benefits of membership-based
organisations. The benefits from participation have to be
weighed against the costs. If the net cost of participation
becomes too high, other models that might be less
participatory might become more efficient, or we might
be satisfied with a minimal-participation version of a
mutual/non-profit. On this view, we should advocate
whichever model has the best trade-off between benefits
and costs from member participation. 
In order to understand better what we mean by costs 
and benefits, we begin with the work of Hansmann on
governance costs. Then we open up the argument further
by considering the benefits of participation to the boards,
managers and members of mutuals/non profits and the
ways in which a business strategy of maximising
participation can provide a ‘co-operative advantage’.
Hansmann argues that ‘costs will be minimised if
ownership is assigned to the class of patrons for whom
the problems of market contracting – that is, the costs of
market imperfections – are most severe’.54 He suggests
that with a natural monopoly the costs are minimised by
having the firm owned by its customers. In our terms, he
advocates a single-stakeholder mutual. On balance, those
who have the best claim on grounds of efficiency, then,
must be domestic consumers. However, this only remains
true if the governance costs – making collective decisions,
monitoring managers, and the costs of failing to do these
– are not too high. It is not clear that consumers have the
incentive to take on the governance costs, or that
managers can be persuaded to develop a participatory
culture and member relations’ strategy. As Leadbeater
and Christie note, while member participation is the 
main strength of a mutual, in practice it is often its 
main weakness.55 It is time-consuming and difficult for
managers and for members, decision-making procedures
are ‘hard to devise and maintain’, and the membership
can become too large and dispersed to maintain
incentives for participation, or too inward-looking and
dominated by sectional interests. 
We can see evidence of these kinds of costs from the
history of the retail consumer co-operative sector. During
the period of rapid change in retailing from the 1950s
onwards, co-ops in retailing have been much slower 
at reacting to market signals than their multiple chain
competitors. Across Western Europe they have been
unwilling to make structural changes, and have either
gone out of business or had their market share severely
reduced. They have been held back partly by a defensive,
industrial working class culture combined with highly
oligarchic decision-making leading to some spectacular
failures in corporate governance.56
However, Hansmann goes on to argue that, despite these
costs, a consumer-owned but not controlled mutual may
still be an efficient option. Paraphrasing his argument, we
can say that a non-participatory mutual is better than
investor ownership if it: 
• avoids the costs of wide participation;
• by not encouraging participation, avoids costly conflicts
between different types of member;
• will still stop others from exploiting the consumer in 
a monopoly situation (ie blocks less efficient forms of 
ownership); and
• returns the net profits to the consumer rather 
than investors.
A mutual might, then, be the least-costly ownership
option, even if it falls short of the participatory
governance implicit in its constitution (though in such 
a case it might be better to set the organisation up as a
non-profit run in the public interest rather than a ‘pseudo-
mutual’). Also, consumer control need not be all that
costly. Modern methods of communication such as the
Internet and email groups cut down on the costs. Some
costs will be covered by the kinds of regular contact with
consumers that the utility would have anyway: annual
bills can be accompanied by a newsletter or a voting
card, for example, and market research can be turned
into a more participatory exercise. 
The more homogeneous the owners are, the lower the
costs will be. Where mutuals work best – as in US rural
electricity co-ops or Australian irrigation mutuals – the
consumer owners of water are a relatively homogeneous
group. In the UK water industry, there would be clear
differences of interest between business and domestic
users; one group would hardly want to subsidise the
other. Then within the business sector there would be
differences between large industrial users and smaller
businesses. Already, in the publicly owned Scottish water
industry, there is controversy over the likely impact of the
industrial users being allowed to contract with alternative
suppliers. Then within the domestic sector there would
The costs and benefits of
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be some tension between rich and poor users and
between large and small households over, for instance,
the use of meters and treatment of debtors. There might
be a difference between those who take a long and short-
term view, trading off lower prices against investment
that minimises the impact on the environment. If these
differences of interest are likely to be large and
persistent, and if agreement cannot be reached over the
weighting of membership rights to reflect and balance
these interests, then a non-member non-profit alternative
would be less costly. 
On the other hand, a lack of consumer control can also be
costly. Before the 1986 Act, building societies could avoid
involving members because the environment was highly
regulated and not very competitive; there were not many
important decisions to make. With no pressure to
distribute surpluses, a low-risk strategy of building up
large reserves was followed. The costs of this minimal
participation strategy only appeared with deregulation,
when the members were able to demutualise and take
the surpluses for themselves. In the mutual insurance
sector, the costs have been even higher: the misselling of
endowment mortgages pensions, and now the failure of
one of the most successful mutuals – Equitable Life –
show what can happen when members are not consulted.
Of course, we can never know exactly what difference
consultation would have made; it is possible that without
adequate information members would have allowed
managers to continue unchecked. However, had
members had a strong, independent voice and access 
to information, it is much less likely that these failures
would have happened in the first place. 
Third, consumer control can also bring competitive
benefits. It could be argued that in sectors where some
attempt has been made to open up governance to
members – friendly societies, credit unions, housing co-
ops and some consumer co-ops – the benefits have been
outweighed by the costs. Encouraging participation by
members can provide for an information rich
environment and for trust relations to build up, important
benefits that make the costs to boards and managers
worthwhile.57 Some people go further, arguing that
member participation provides the necessary conditions
for a ‘co-operative advantage’ to be gained, that will
show up positively in the trading results. The aim is to
promote social goals and ethical practices that are
implicit in co-operative principles, in such a way that the
incorporation of these goals and practices into the
business strategy gives a commercial advantage over
one’s competitors. The return of benefits to members
completes a virtuous circle, demonstrating both the
ethical and commercial superiority of co-operatives.58
A related argument against single stakeholder mutuals is
that, if they do not maintain the interest of the members
and participation is low, their governance may be
captured by a narrower interest group. One of the
reasons the regulator turned down the idea of a mutual
for Kelda was because of a concern that undue influence
might be gained by sectional interests. One of the
reasons why the Glas Cymru case was accepted was
because the vehicle of ownership was a company limited
by guarantee rather than a mutual registered as an
Industrial and Provident Society. The customers would
not be the owners, but ownership would be entrusted to
the board of the company on their behalf. However, the
argument can be overstated. Other forms of business
organisation are just as susceptible to capture by
minority interests. The remedy is not to take away
democratic control but to make sure it works properly to
represent different viewpoints. But this points not to pure
consumer ownership but at the minimum to some form
of multi-stakeholder governance and at the maximum
multi-stakeholder ownership. 
The costs and benefits of membership
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The arguments outlined above concerning the failure 
of water companies and Railtrack to perform lead to a
view that shareholder-owned businesses are
inappropriate. They do not necessarily lead to the view
that shareholders should not be involved at all. One
argument against taking shareholders out of ownership
is that, because debt markets do not provide as strong 
a pressure as do investor-owners, managers and
directors face fewer pressures to perform. The regulator
made this argument in relation to Glas Cymru, but it
concluded that performance indicators, statements of
intent to provide customer rebates, and market
competition for operations, would have to suffice.59
This is not so much an argument against consumer
ownership as against inadequate governance structures.
It reinforces the view that Glas should have a wider
membership base and a stronger set of procedures for
election of directors. It is also an argument that flies in the
face of some very strong evidence that in investor-owned
businesses the shareholders do not have much influence
over managers anyway. 
Another argument against excluding shareholders
altogether is that other stakeholders then have to take 
the burden of risk. The water industry is not very risky,
yet the prospect of customers taking on large amounts of
debt led to criticism of Kelda’s proposal for a consumer
buyout. It is significant that the idea of a mutual came in
Kelda’s case from a ‘board decision to focus aggressively
on shareholder value’, in particular to return to investors
the capital received from sale of the water assets, and to
concentrate on developing the provision of (non-
regulated) services to the wider water industry. It was
about getting out of an unprofitable area into a more
profitable one. In this respect it resembles some
employee share ownership schemes that also look on 
the surface to be about empowering workers but are
really about finding an exit strategy for investors.60
Critics argued that the taking on of a massive debt
burden of 100 per cent of the cost of around £2.4 billion
was not fair on consumers. One analyst estimated a cash
shortfall of £151m per year, an affordability gap that
meant a poor deal for consumers, who will be owners
without being beneficiaries and therefore that the:
‘members will own the debts and the banks will own the
revenue stream’.61 On the other hand, it was claimed that
the plan would have had benefits to consumers: lowering
the relative cost of capital (debt taken out by consumers
being cheaper to service than shares); providing the
Arguments against excluding
shareholders from ownership
The costs and benefits of membership
Building mutuality back in – the case of the life
insurance sector
One of the ironies of demutualisation in the UK life
insurance sector is that supervisory boards
representing policy-holders are likely 
to be imposed on the companies by the regulator,
the Financial Services Authority. Appointed
actuaries will be replaced by a committee of
externally appointed experts, policyholder
representatives and non-executive directors. This is
because the £30 billion of ‘orphan assets’ – money
not allocated to meet the immediate obligations to
policyholders – in the companies will, otherwise, be
stolen by the shareholders. The problem has
affected mutuals as well, because the existing
arrangements, whereby actuaries sit on boards to
represent member interests, did not prevent the
crisis in Equitable Life which has been caused by
one kind of member being privileged at the expense
of another. The lesson to be learned by both mutual
and investor-owned insurance companies is that
someone has to look after the interests of the
customers from within the boardroom. 
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Perhaps the strongest argument against mutualisation is
that the consumers will not be interested enough to take
part in governance to ensure that the organisation is run
for their benefit. The Scottish government decided
against mutualisation for Scotland’s water, on the ground
that customers do not have sufficient incentive to become
active members. It is important that this issue be
addressed. At Stirling University, this author and his
colleague, Richard Simmons, are developing a mutual
incentives model of participation that shows whether or
not people are likely to want to participate under different
circumstances. We begin by identifying the characteristics
of the relationship between consumer and producer,
which varies by sector in at least four ways: 
1. the degree of continuity of need (from occasional 
through intermittent to continuing).
2. the degree of intensity of the need (on a hierarchy of 
needs from frivolous through important to life-saving).
3. the degree of financial involvement of individual 
consumers (from no involvement, ie publicly 
funded, through means-tested to market-based).
4. the degree of consumer competence in assessing the 
quality of the product or service (from consumer-
driven through to professionally dominated).
We can generalise that, other things being equal, the
greater the continuity, intensity, financial involvement 
and consumer competence in a particular sector, the
more likely people will be to participate. For instance, 
the National Health Service in the UK is professionally
dominated, publicly funded, and the relationship of
patients is often intermittent. Participation of patients has
always proved difficult to organise. However, the intensity
of their need makes up for this to some extent. Education
has some continuity, with parents being involved over at
least 12 years of a child’s life. They are often intensely
interested in the outcomes for a particular child, can
assess the competence of teaching by its results. This
compensates for lack of financial involvement (in state
schooling). Council tenants also have a continuing
involvement with their landlord, their home matters to
them, and there is no mystery to housing management.
However, where a high percentage of households have
their rent paid fully by the benefits system, this may
undermine their motivation to seek value for money in
estate management. In water utilities there is a
continuous need, but it is not a very intense one (except
when the supply fails or the water quality goes down),
security of customer ownership; and providing a means
by which surpluses could be used on their behalf. 
In the case of Railtrack, there is concern that the new
non-profit company will be taking on the risk of large-
scale enterprises such as the West Coast rail route, whose
costs have already quadrupled. In this case, having the
diffused ownership of a non-profit spreads the risk. In
practical terms, since Network Rail cannot be allowed to
go bankrupt, this leaves the risk with the government of
the day. One alternative that is being explored is to take
high-risk engineering schemes outside the business and
form public-private partnerships to deliver them instead.
Another is to allow a proportion of the shares in a
company to be taken up by investors. A Social Market
Foundation report recently suggested that a 20 per cent
investment would lower the risk for other stakeholders in
the Glas Cymru model.62 This would point to the need for
a company limited by shares rather than a non-profit,
because the former has identifiable share capital to
apportion between stakeholders. A mutual also has
identifiable shareholders, but these are limited to people
who make use the business rather than merely investors. 
Mutuals and co-operatives have always been reluctant to
dilute their control by issuing voting shares. Usually they
raise capital by issuing loan stock (in industrial and
provident societies) or preference shares (in companies
limited by guarantee) rather than full voting stock. It is
difficult to combine ownership and control by
shareholders with that of other stakeholders whose
interests are diametrically opposed. It has been tried in
Irish agricultural co-ops, and the experience has not been
a very happy one. The message seems to be that it is not
a good idea to bring investor-owners into a business
owned by consumers, even if the latter remain in the
majority. It is better to form new joint ventures, or a
looser form of partnership.63 
This concern about risk led the water regulator to insist
that Kelda give customers the chance to vote on the
proposal, on the basis that substantial financial burdens
should not be put on them without their informed
consent. This points to another advantage of the 
non-member non-profit form, that it does not need 
such consent. On the other hand, it also lacks the
legitimacy of a company in which stakeholder interest 
is more identifiable. 
Arguments against excluding shareholders 
from ownership
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nor will consumers be particularly interested in the
technical questions of how it is supplied (though
environmental concerns are growing among some
consumers). They will, however, be interested in
obtaining value for money as well as a voice in the
running of a monopoly service that they need, but from
which they cannot exit. In transport, the main problem is
that journeys are often occasional or intermittent, and so
only season-ticket holders might expect to be involved as
members, though they would be more interested in
influencing the train operating companies directly, rather
than indirectly through governance of the track. The
technical questions of safety and timeliness are of great
interest to travellers, their need is intense, and they are
financially committed. Once people have made a decision
about where to live and to work, they are locked into a
monopoly-like situation in which they often have no
choice about which route to travel. This is shown in the
fact that many passengers are already involved both in
regional rail user committees and in voluntary groupings
based around a station or branch line. 
The analysis then moves on to consider three
background conditions for participation: 
1. prior member resources; 
2. opportunities to participate; and 
3. an organisational participation strategy. 
First, the civic voluntarism model of citizen participation
has found that the best predictor of whether people will
participate in voluntary situations is the resources they
bring to it. In particular, they bring ‘civic skills’ derived
from their involvement with institutions that have taught
them how to participate. Not surprisingly, higher income
and educational level correlate well with participation.
Added to their resources, participators bring a
psychological engagement with politics.64 What this
means for participation in mutuals is that, other things
being equal, we should expect lower participation levels
in those mutuals whose members have lower incomes
and educational levels, and have developed less of a
‘taste’ for politics (credit unions, consumer co-ops) than
in those whose members have more of these resources
(life insurance mutuals and building societies). This was
demonstrated recently when three groups of Equitable
Life members set up websites to deal with the insurer’s
financial crisis (Equitable specialises in pensions for
people on high incomes). 
In the case of water and transport, since all citizens are
customers, we can expect a large minority to have the
required resources, but there would be a bias towards
higher social classes that might have to be compensated
for in the design of governance structures. 
Second, it is self-evident that opportunities are needed if
there is to be participation. In many mutuals, the lack of
publicity for annual meetings, of contested elections, of
contact with members, have meant there has been
almost no opportunity for participation. It is ironic that
the vote for demutualisation has often been the first time
members have been made aware of their status as
owners. The large size of modern mutuals also restricts
opportunities, since only a very small proportion of
members can be involved at the top level. As a recent
report on building society governance concludes, there is
a need for federal structures designed to connect people
up to large mutuals, and electoral college systems that
reward active participation.65 In rail transport there is an
active national consumer council and regional
committees, funded by government through the Strategic
Rail Authority. These structures could be built on to
provide a means by which consumers could be
represented on a multi-stakeholder service provider. In
water, there used to be a consumer council but it has
lapsed. There is ‘proxy’ consumer representation, not
directly with the companies but with the regulator. In this
case some rapid institution-building would be necessary
if consumers were either to take control in a single-
stakeholder mutual, or be represented in a multi-
stakeholder body. 
Third, it follows that there has to be an organisational
strategy for participation. It cannot be left to itself, in the
way it could in the small-scale, locally based co-ops,
friendly societies and building societies of the Victorian
age. Managers have to be charged with setting up and
staffing participatory structures such as area or regional
committees or forums, with organising an information-
rich environment in which members are listened to and
their views collated, and with providing supports for
participants such as training, office facilities, and expense
budgets. Such a strategy is beginning to be established in
some UK consumer co-ops and building societies. The
difficulty with designing an organisational strategy for
water is that the companies operate over large areas, and
have no clear local focus such as a shop or branch on the
high street. Transport is better focused – there are already
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over 200 voluntary rail user groups around the country,
focused on particular travel to work areas. 
Assuming the structures are in place to provide
opportunities, and that there is a management strategy to
maximise participation, the question now becomes – will
people be motivated to participate? The idea that people
need incentives to participate has been used successfully
to explain membership of political parties.66 Our mutual
incentives theory assumes that people are motivated by 
a mixture of both individual and collective incentives.
Individual self-interest is easier to deal with, as it is the
basis of exchange and rational choice theories that
provide some detailed generalisations. The term
‘collective’ refers to a process by which individuals come
to see their own aims and values in terms of a wider
community, and so find it difficult to account for their
motives entirely in terms of self-interest. 
At the individual level, people calculate the costs and
benefits of taking part. The costs to members are the
opportunity-costs of giving their time and energy to this
rather than to other activities, and the psychological costs
of engagement; the risk that participation may not give
the expected benefits, leading to frustration, anger or
apathy.67 The literature on rational choice makes gloomy
reading on this subject. Taking its starting point that
people do not have a reasonable incentive to vote in
elections, it attempts to find ways of overcoming this
built-in disincentive in order to explain why so many
people do, in practice, vote. There are two problems
participants have to overcome: a temptation to free ride
on other people’s participation and a calculation that
one’s own participation will not have any noticeable
effect on the outcome. There are several possible ways of
minimising the ‘collective action’ problem that results.
First, participation may not be all that costly. Some types,
such as voting, take little effort such as filling in a voting
card. Second, in certain circumstances (such as local
rather than national political participation) a person’s
participation does have an effect. Third, participants may
find that the ‘expressive’ aspect, making one’s views and
feelings known, is itself a benefit. 
Benefits can be classified into material and non-material.
The material benefits include immediate benefits from
taking part and longer term ones from maximising the
return from the business. In terms of immediate benefits,
it is often assumed that participants should not be paid,
but attendance allowances and annual ‘honorariums’ 
are often used for customer panels or focus groups, and
expenses can be budgeted for. The longer-term benefits
can be substantial, providing the members have real
control over the business and over how surpluses are
allocated. One of the main incentives for participation in
consumer co-ops used to be that they declared an annual
dividend on purchases; there was intense speculation
among ordinary members about the rate, and much
holding to account of directors when dividends were
lower than expected.68 The problem with water and
transport is that dividends are more likely to be returned
in lower prices in the future rather than cash payments,
and members face the collective action problem of 
not knowing how much their personal participation 
has counted. 
Non-material benefits include increased self-confidence, 
a social life, increased knowledge, a sense of personal
efficacy, increased employability, and so on. Preliminary
results from the current study show that these are very
important, and, for activists, far outweigh the costs.
Particularly valued is the ‘chance to have a say’ in how 
a service is run. The benefits only follow if the quality 
of the relationship between the participant and the
organisation’s managers and board members is good.
The terms of the relationship have to be made clear, time
must be taken to build up trust, and the managers have
to demonstrate their effectiveness in responding to the
demands made by the participants. 
One important non-material benefit is that participants
enjoy taking part because the subject is an interesting
one. A problem for water utilities is that their product,
while so important for sustaining life, is also rather
mundane. Apart from concerns with water quality and the
environment, members might not have much to interest
them. However, it can be made interesting: some water
companies in England have developed interactive
displays at reservoirs and pumping stations that attract
large numbers of visitors. The environmental interest is
growing, especially among young people. In transport,
the subject attracts a minority of dedicated fans, so much
so that the term ‘train spotter’ is used to denote anyone
who has a narrow or pedantic interest in something.
Again, a management strategy can make it more
interesting to potential participants, and the sheer
complexity of running a railway or tube system could be
appealing. It also depends on what participants are being
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asked to do. Members of a utility mutual may be
interested enough to read an annual report, or voting
information from a candidate for the board, or even 
to browse a website, even if they never serve on a
committee. When people do join a decision-making
group, providing it is seen to be effective, they tend 
to find that their interest grows over time. 
Participants often say they will participate even if they 
do not continue to receive these individual benefits. This
seems contradictory, but they are saying they have
collective incentives that outweigh the individual ones.
Again, results from a study of council housing and social
care services show that we can expect active participants
rapidly to build up collective commitments that far
outweigh considerations of personal benefit or cost. 
We distinguish three types: shared goals, shared beliefs,
and a sense of community. The sharing of goals that one
values highly is a major source of commitment. Council
tenants who want decent housing and a clean and safe
environment for their children, people with learning
difficulties who want the local authority to provide the
support services they need, day care centre users who
want to improve the quality of food, are expressing a
mutual need which translates into common goals. 
The difficulty with a water mutual might be that, though
everyone values the product, it is hard to see how
collective action by members can improve it. Transport 
is more complex, and more amenable to actions at a
local level to improve parts of the service. Shared beliefs
are important for participants in campaigning
organisations, political parties and churches. In water
provision, the main motivation might be a belief in the
environment, but this could lead to an attempt by well-
motivated interest groups to take control, a scenario that
has led OFWAT to prefer a non-profit to a single-
stakeholder mutual form. The sense of community
motivates people because they care about other people
who either live in the same area, or people who are like
them in some respect (the elderly, the disabled, local
commuters). Community is a major motivator on council
estates, where residents either want to preserve or to
rebuild it. It is difficult to see how this would motivate
members of a water mutual, as no one identifies strongly
with a water catchment area (though water did engender
strong loyalties when it was owned by local authorities).
There may be a small incentive effect in relation to
regional or national feelings; Glas Cymru has been
strongly supported by people in Wales, because it is seen
to be restoring ownership to ‘the people’. In transport,
because rail and bus lines link people’s home and work
lives, the sense of community may be strong. This is
shown particularly when a line is threatened with closure. 
Preliminary results from a comparison of participation 
by public service users and active members of retail 
co-operatives shows that those who have been
participating longer are much more committed to
collective values than newly active members. This 
means that in any new rail or water mutual it would take
time for active members to build up mutual sentiments. 
It is probably that they would eventually do so, but their
participation would need to be nurtured. 
The generalisations applied so far predict quite low levels
of participation among potential members. At this point it
is worth asking what types and levels of participation are
needed? For effective governance, all members need to
be kept informed, and a large minority need to be
sufficiently interested to vote for board members. A small
minority of activists is needed to provide monitoring of
the board’s performance, to replace board members
when their term is ended, and to represent important
interest groups on a broader-based body such as a
stakeholder council or consumer advisory group. Mass
participation can only be expected when things go badly
wrong (though the opportunity presented by a mutual for
members to take action when things do go wrong is a
major advantage). 
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Mutual water utilities have been shown to work
In the USA, there are around 1000 electricity utility 
co-ops and 244 telephone co-ops, based in rural areas,
though the water industry is split between investor-
owned and municipal firms.69 The electricity co-ops
supply power to 10 per cent of the population,
including half of all farm households. They are partially
vertically integrated, in that they draw around 45 per
cent of their power from co-operative generators in
which they are members. Like water, these are
homogeneous commodities, with a relatively
homogeneous consumer interest. Like the proposed
water mutuals, their assets are financed mainly 
by debt. 
Water mutuals in Australia
In 1995, the water industry in Australia began to be
privatised, but not just to conventional investor-owned
corporations. The assets of South West Irrigation were
transferred to an irrigator-owned mutual, SWIMCO,
which has 2300 members. Its operations business was
transferred to a co-operative. Since then, four other
mutuals have been formed on similar lines. They have
‘proven to be highly robust and efficient’, they now
operate multi-million dollar sinking funds, the working
structure is highly consumer-focused, and there is a
corporate emphasis on the long-term financial and
engineering feasibility of the system.70
A water co-operative for a large city?
SAGUAPAC is a co-operative that, since 1979, has been
providing water supply and sewerage services to the
one million inhabitants of the largest city in Bolivia,
Santa Cruz. All 96,000 domestic customers are
automatically members of the co-op. They elect
members of the administrative board from nine water
districts. They also elect a separate supervisory board
that monitors the performance of the administrative
board. A study undertaken by Birmingham University
economists has found that it is one of the best run
water companies in Latin America, with a low level of
water leakage, a 96 per cent bill payment rate, and 80
per cent water coverage, despite rapid population
growth. Its co-operative structure shields managers
from the political interference that weakens municipal
water companies, and it can implement new
investment projects faster than other companies. The
model is being copied elsewhere in Bolivia, in the
towns of Tarija (1988) and Trinidad (1991). One report
has found that, though it is highly regarded by the
World Bank, the model is not being promoted actively
because of pressure from powerful international 
water companies wishing to sell their services in
developing countries.71
Mutuality on the railways
Mutuality is already being practised at the edges of 
the railway system. In rural areas, on long-neglected
branch lines, community-rail partnerships are being
formed. Bringing together train operators, local
authorities, parish councils, community groups and
local businesses, they aim to support a particular line
by connecting it up with buses, improving the
environment of stations, increasing the frequency of
services, preparing local transport plans, advocating
local residents’ rail cards, and so on. There are 30 
such partnerships, federated in the Association of
Community-Rail Partnerships. The Association is
developing the idea of ‘micro-franchising’; if local rail
services were put out to tender, as they are in Germany,
local multi-stakeholder mutuals could bid to 
run them.72
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We are now at the stage where we can make some
recommendations about the relative merits of the four
different organisational forms outlined above in relation
to water and rail infrastructure. We have some useful
generalisations about how costly and how risky member
participation is likely to be, and whether or not people
will participate. There are four key questions: 
1. Should there be a genuine membership?
2. If so, which stakeholder group or groups should 
be members?
3. Should they be given full ownership rights (a 
mutual rather than a non-profit) or just the right 
to take part in governance?
4. If a multi-stakeholder option is chosen, how will 
the rights of each stakeholder be determined?
The idea of a mutual to own the assets of the water
industry came from the private companies themselves. 
It is no wonder that both the Glas and Kelda proposals
stayed on the lower rungs of the ladder of representation,
because shareholders wanted to offload the less
profitable part of the business while keeping the contract
for operations. For this they needed a fairly cosy
relationship between the new board and the contractor.
The result was one successful bid to set up a limited-
member (arguably in the terms being used here, non-
member) non-profit and one failed bid to set up a not
very convincing single stakeholder mutual. The Scottish
Parliament rejected this idea, because they were not
convinced that consumers would want to participate in
the long run. Yet the water industry has one simple asset
– it has a known, relatively stable and relatively
homogeneous set of customers. It would be quite easy to
offer them membership in a single-stakeholder consumer
mutual. Shares could be weighted so that domestic
customers get one each and business customers more,
on a formula that would recognise the latter’s greater use
of the business. In the usual way that Industrial and
Provident societies work, it could cap the number of
shares any one customer could hold at say 200, so that
no one business or group of businesses could dominate.
Then the shareholders could vote their representatives
directly on to the board. The participation costs would 
be low, because information-giving and voting could be
linked to the regular bills that are sent out to customers,
and much of the organising of interests could be done on
websites and email groups. 
There are three problems with this suggestion. First, 
it would require that management and the board have 
a continuing strategy for involving members in
governance, otherwise it could easily slip into a routine
endorsement of a governor/manager oligarchy. It might
not provide as rigorous a check on managerial
complacency as other forms of governance; its record in
the financial services mutuals and consumer co-ops in
this respect is not very good. The interest of a mass
membership in such a mundane activity as water delivery
would be difficult to keep up. It might be in danger of
capture by an interest group that has the motivation to
become organised. Second, it would not represent all the
stakeholders that need to be represented. Someone
should represent the environment, the long-term needs
of consumers who are not yet members, and the interests
of the workforce. Third, it would leave any financial
surpluses to be divided among users in whatever way
they want. This looks like an advantage, but it could be 
a source of conflict between different types of user, and
could discount the environment or future users against
immediate gains. All of these problems point to the need
for some strong public interest in the governance of the
industry, either through continued regulation or a public
stake in the business.
A multi-stakeholder water mutual could add board level
representation by other interests such as local authorities,
environmental groups and the workforce. This would
almost certainly avoid the problems identified above. But
this raises another important point. Would it need to be a
mutual? The main advantages of a mutual are that it
defines a set of owners and gives them rights to any
surpluses. In the case of water, the infrastructure includes
human-made assets such as pumping stations, water
treatment plants and so on. But it also includes natural
assets such as aquifers, watersheds and rain. There is a
strong argument that this should not be owned by
anyone in particular, but by the public and that
environmental issues also need to be taken more
strongly into account. These arguments point towards a
multi-stakeholder non-profit with a clearly remit outlined
in the constitution. 
The main question then becomes how the various
stakeholders would be given a collective identity and
then represented. There is no need to slip down the
ladder and accept either proxy representation by self-
appointed governors or representation by the
Who should own the water
industry?
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In public transport, the nature of the relationship 
between customers and providers is quite different. 
Not all householders are customers, and if they are 
their involvement is often intermittent. Only regular
travellers, particularly season-ticket holders, would have
the incentive to become members of something. As we 
have seen, they have stronger incentives than water
consumers to participate. It looks as if the two industries
have much in common; it is the infrastructural assets that
are to be transferred, leaving operations to be contracted
out. But the similarities are superficial. Rail services are
much more complex than water delivery. The
infrastructure owner is also responsible for maintaining
and upgrading the track. Operators are responsible for
making sure there are trains that run on time. Customer
members would probably be more interested in the latter
which has a more immediate payoff. Also, the arguments
for multi-stakeholder involvement are compelling; given
the amount of public subsidy going into the business,
there should be a strong public interest presence. These
(and other) good reasons make the decision to set up
Network Rail as a multi-stakeholder organisation rather
than a consumer mutual an inevitable one. 
The decision to make it a non-profit rather than a mutual
is less self-evident. It could issue shares to different
stakeholder interests, and link these to voting rights as
has been done in the privatisation of air traffic control.
This has the advantage that stakeholders know that their
governance rights cannot later be changed or over-
ridden. The proportion of shares given to each interest
could be balanced carefully to ensure that the public
interest has a ‘golden share’. It also has the advantage
that any financial surpluses made can be distributed in 
an explicit way in lower operating charges or increased
investment. However, the prospect of rail infrastructure
ever making a surplus remains remote. A non-profit is
therefore the simpler option. 
Again, this does not mean that there is an excuse for
slipping down the ladder of representation towards 
proxy representation or the filling of places by the ‘great
and the good’. Given the complexity of the stakeholder
interests, representation by individuals is unlikely and
representation through existing organisations is
inevitable. However, these organisations should be
challenged to develop membership rights that allow their
members directly to elect representatives to Network
Rail’s stakeholder council. This would mean, for instance,
professional staff of existing organisations. Local
authorities already have the means democratically to
elect their representatives, as do trade unions. Consumers
could be organised to elect their representatives directly
through postal voting. In fact, all the strengths of the
consumer mutual option could be built into this with
none of the weaknesses. If consumer participation proves
to be too costly, then they can be represented less directly
by a statutory consumer council. But if the members of
this are not themselves elected by consumers, we are
back to proxy representation and the opportunity for
direct involvement of customers will have been lost.
The main recommendations in relation to water 
are therefore:
1. Water companies that want to sell their assets should 
be given a clear lead by OFWAT as to what sort of 
successor organisation is acceptable. This should be 
along the lines of a multi-stakeholder non-profit.
2. The new companies should be designed by a working 
group made up of representatives of the key 
stakeholders (including consumers), and endorsed 
by OFWAT.
3. They should consider the merits of having a two-
tier structure of a management board and a 
stakeholder council.
4. The constitution of the new companies should include 
direct election of consumer representatives by 
customers. At first, the consumer board members 
should be appointed by the OFWAT National Customer
Council, but as soon as is practical board members 
elected by the members in a postal ballot should 
replace them
5. The new National Consumer Council for water should 
be a more participatory form of organisation than its 
predecessor. It should have a regional structure, with 
each regional water company setting up a consumer 
council that is directly elected by residential and small 
business customers in a postal ballot, and that has 
reserved places on the board. 
Who should own the water industry? How should Network Rail be
organised?
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turning the Rail Passengers Council and its committees
into a more member-owned organisation. The analysis 
of what motivates people to participate shows that there
would be no problems in fostering member participation. 
The main recommendations in relation to the proposed
new model for Railtrack – Network Rail – are:
1. The assets of Railtrack should be transferred to a new 
company, set up as a multi-stakeholder non-profit.
2. The new company should be designed by a working 
group made up of representatives of the key 
stakeholders, and endorsed by the Rail Regulator.
3. Key stakeholders should include the train operating 
companies, the workforce trade unions, the 
government, and consumer representatives.
4. Again, it should consider not having a unitary board 
but a two-tier structure of management board and a 
stakeholder council.
5. The constitution of the new company should include 
direct election of consumer representatives by 
customers. At first, the boards should be appointed 
from existing national and regional chairs of the Rail 
Passengers Council, but as soon as is practical board 
members elected by the members in a postal ballot 
should replace them.
6. The Rail Passengers Council and its regional 
committees should become democratically elected 
bodies, with a membership of regular travellers and 
local voluntary rail groups. It should be charged with 
developing a membership strategy to achieve this, and
then to sustain members’ interest. It would then elect 
consumer members of the board of Network Rail.
The National Air Traffic Control System (NATS) is an
interesting case of a company that is investor-owned 
but because of the structure of the share ownership looks
more like a multi-stakeholder mutual. The fact that the
airlines that own a 46 per cent stake have pledged not 
to take surpluses for commercial gain reinforces this
impression. It is more like a mutual than a non-profit
because ownership is clearly assigned, and the
shareholders can still use the surpluses to lower prices 
to the consumer. However, the involvement of travellers
is very indirect; we have to accept that their interests are
being protected either by the public stake or by the
airlines. The company recently got into financial
difficulties and has had to be bailed out with a £30 million
cash injection from the UK Government, matched by the
banks. When it was under public ownership, NATS had a
consumer council, and there are proposals to revive this.
If the company needs any further help from public funds
it would be easy for government to issue new shares
directly to such a consumer council. Again, this could be
a genuine member organisation if it offers membership 
to regular travellers, perhaps using the services of airline
customer clubs. 
The train operating companies are currently entirely
investor-owned. Some of them have developed airline-
type clubs for regular travellers. They have influence only
through the Rail Passengers Council, whose members are
currently appointed by the Strategic Rail Authority. There
is another way they can gain direct access to governance.
Like football supporters, they could buy shares in the
companies and dedicate the resulting governance rights
to a passenger trust. This would give them direct access
to and, over time, some control over, the way the train
services are provided. 
Other developmentsHow should Network Rail be organised?
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Conclusion
A decade ago, nobody would have predicted that the idea of ‘mutuality’ would have become so fashionable. 
In the last few decades of the twentieth century, the mutual sector had lost its collective nerve. Consumer 
co-ops tried to be just like other retailers, closing their small, local shops and opening superstores. Mutual insurers
mis-sold pensions with as much enthusiasm as did their investor-owned competitors. Building societies were as
ruthless as banks in evicting mortgage defaulters. Friendly societies continued the decline that had begun when 
state social security was established in the 1940s. Then, just before the turn of the century, something remarkable
happened. They began to get their nerve back. Co-ops began to concentrate on their small stores and brought back
the dividend, becoming what they had always claimed to be – community retailers. Those building societies that
resisted demutualisation began to pay attention to their membership, offering loyalty bonuses and emphasising the
benefits of not having a separate group of investors with whom to share profits. Now, the pendulum is in danger of
swinging the other way, so that mutuality is seen as a panacea for all ills, offering social inclusion, an alternative
means of delivering public services, and an ethical alternative to global capitalism. It could be these things, but there
is much work to be done. First, we have to design governance structures and member relations strategies that work,
and are sustainable over time. Then we have to face up to the need to bring more than one stakeholder into the
business – the old consumer co-op model is not enough. Then we have to ask whether or not members need full
rights of ownership, or whether in some cases the more diffuse ownership structure of a non-profit might be better. 
But unless ‘mutuality’ (in the broader sense of the term) is given a chance to work – and to evolve through practice –
its potential will not be realised. In relation to water and rail it could become a viable alternative to private, profit-
making companies that will always, by their very nature, put the interests of their investors before the interests of
the consumers, the workers and the wider community.
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tual Trend: 
Key public interest industries such as water and rail have swung between
public and private ownership since the beginning of the industrial
revolution over 250 years ago. Johnston Birchall charts the change in
ownership over time and the struggle to harness the private sector for
public ends. He argues that we have not learned the lessons of history –
the current models and regulation have failed to deliver. Either the
interests of consumers and other key stakeholders are sacrificed or the
profitability of the company is undermined.
However, current initiatives in water and rail, such as the new not-for-
profit model for Railtrack – Network Rail - and Glas Cymru – a not-for-
profit water company – present opportunities to put customers and the
wider public interest back into the centre of the business. Birchall sets
out the potential for radical new models for not-for-profits with
multistakeholder governance which address the democratic deficit in our
public interest companies and public services. He argues that we can 
tual Trend: 
create ‘ladders of participation’ for the general public to become involved
in such organisations through a range of innovative ways of engaging
with consumers.
This book will appeal to policy-makers, and anyone interested in future
change in our public services. The report is also the first in a series of
publications which will further develop the ideas expressed in the New
Economics Foundation pamphlet – The Mutual State – which aims to put
the ‘public’ back into public services.
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